Canada’s Air Force Heritage Voice

RCAFA Position Note

The case for the F-35 Lightning II Fighter Program

The Royal Canadian Air Force Association endorses the following points about the F-35 program for Canada:

  • Canada has been a partner in the Joint Strike Fighter / F-35 program since 1997 and is a signatory of the December 31, 2006 Joint Strike Fighter Production, Sustainment and Follow-On Development Memorandum of understanding (JSF PSFD MOU). That means Canada gets a vote that is proportionate to its total buy of aircraft when sitting at the table to determine what goes into the aircraft in terms of upgrades and that Canadian industry gets a share of that work. To date, that has generated over $4+ billion (Cdn) in contracts into Canada prior to even taking delivery of an aircraft. Every component built and sustained in Canada goes into every one of the 2,400 aircraft on order, not just the 88 Canada is buying. Any reduction in total / numbers of aircraft bought will reduce Canada’s ability to shape / influence both the aircraft development as well as Canadian industrial participation. Canada is also getting royalties proportional to our share of the world’s fleet for every F-35 sold around the world.

  • The F-35 was selected as the best option for Canada through a rigorous (perhaps even onerous) competition in which all potential alternatives (Gripen, Eurofighter, Rafale, Super Hornet) were offered the opportunity to compete. All of them have supply chains / suppliers already set notwithstanding final assembly may occur in Canada, which will likely result in an overall net negative industrial benefit to Canada by not selecting the F-35. Canada would be supporting the build and sustainment of a much lower number of aircraft (vice 2,400) and would be procuring an aircraft that represents the pinnacle of 4th generation fighter aircraft development. The F-35 has been selected as the preferred option in 18 NATO nations, as well as Australia, Israel, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Switzerland which delivers significant synergies and efficiencies in areas such as armaments, sustainment, logistics, etc. By way of comparison, the Gripen has an order book of about 300 aircraft and would see Canada partnering with Sweden, Hungary, South Africa, Thailand and Brazil and still require export permissions / logistics/ sustainment from the US in areas such as the engine, which is a US produced engine (the General Electric F-414).

  • Where sovereignty is required, such as in the development of Mission Data Files (MDFs) essential to the operation of the aircraft, Canada has partnered with key allies (United Kingdom and Australia) through the Australia, Canada, UK Reprogramming Lab (ACURL) to ensure sovereign development of that required to ensure Canada can operate the aircraft. There are also talks to include the P-8A Poseidon into the ACURL due to the synergies that could be derived between the two systems. This move would consolidate and further the Intelligence privileged position of Canada within the 5-Eyes community (US, UK, Canada, Australia & New Zealand)

  • Movement away from the US on the F-35 will make integration / cooperation with the United States in Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) within NORAD harder. It risks reducing the value of the NORAD partnership, and Canada’s contribution, to the point of the US simply doing what it wants with respect to IMAD in North American vice working with Canada. Not having a seat at the table will undermine Canada’s sovereignty, not enhance it.

  • Simply put, selecting a 4th generation fighter aircraft for our fundamental sovereignty mission is tantamount to deliberately choosing to be at an operational disadvantage against Russia and China. A 4th generation aircraft cannot successfully intercept a 5th generation aircraft and / or other advanced threats menacing our nation.

  • Trying to operate a dual aircraft fighter fleet will increase costs and complexity to Canada while significantly increasing both the financial and human resource requirements for an already struggling RCAF.

  • It is likely that cancelling 72 F-35 aircraft in a 2,400 aircraft production run will have little or no effect on changing behaviour in the US in Canada’s favour as it relates to trade / tariffs due to its minimal fiscal impact and heavy demand elsewhere and could instead potentially further inflame Canada – US relations.

  • The decision to keep or cancel the F-35 purchase is much more impactful than simply selecting a fighter aircraft. It is also about Canada’s place in the world as a credible and reliable ally and partner. Canada’s vital Intelligence relationships are also highly dependent on our operational platforms.

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