Since the beginning of the Cold War in the 1950’s, the role of Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) has been viewed as essential to the defence of Canada and North America. In 1958, this recognition drove Canada and the US to create the world’s only bi-national military command known as the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).

IAMD has become more relevant as the Arctic grows in strategic importance and potential adversaries develop longer‑range, faster, and more complex weapons. Ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and now the Middle East are demonstrating how missiles and drones have increased in capability and have created a significant asymmetry in which the cost of attack has become significantly less than the cost of defending against them. For Canada, this creates an added impetus to modernize and improve its ability to deter potential adversaries while doing so in a way that is cost effective.

It is within this context that the 2024 Defence Policy Statement, Our North Strong and Free (ONSaF), committed the Government and DND to “further contributions to the integrated air and missile defence of Canada and North America”. It recognizes that the growing variety and complexity of threats, including drones, advanced cruise missiles and hypersonics, demands an increased investment in IAMD at home and abroad to ensure the Canadian Armed Force (CAF) is able to operate effectively and contribute to collective security. While the NORAD Modernization policy released in 2022 focuses on modernizing the current enterprise, it is ONSaF that articulates the ways and means by which Canada will improve its ability to deter, detect, defend and defeat potential incursions into Canadian sovereign territory.

NATO, in its 2025 policy statement, describes IAMD as being comprised of Air Surveillance, Battle Management, Command, Control, Communications and Information (BMC3I), Active Air and Missile Defence, and Passive Air and Missile Defence. Efforts already underway in NORAD Modernization and being pursued under ONSaF mirror this construct as evidenced by projects such as Over The Horizon Radar (OTHR), Airborne Early Warning (AEW), Enhanced Satellite Communications Project – Polar (ESCP-P), Future Combined Air Operations Centre Capability (FCC) and Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) brought together in a multi-domain approach that integrates capabilities from all domains (air, land, sea, space, cyber). The variety, complexity and potential volume of the threats necessitate a command-and-control system that leverages advanced capabilities such as cloud architecture and Artificial Intelligence (AI) and which can facilitate seamless integration of sensors, effectors and decision-making processes across multiple structures, forces and platforms. Achieving an effective IAMD is as much about data integration as it is about the platforms used. It also mandates continued close coordination and integration with the US given the 360-degree nature of the threats. Crucially, and as recognized by the Government of Canada in 2025, this includes Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) if it is to be effective.

Designing and building an improved IAMD in Canada requires a clear assessment of what it is that needs to be defended. This is defined as the Critical Asset List (CAL) which includes key infrastructure, facilities and resources that must be protected due to their strategic importance. While it includes traditional military infrastructure such as basing and command and control nodes, it also includes many of the targets Iran is currently striking in the Middle East including port facilities, power generation facilities, energy storage facilities and critical transportation routes. In the Canadian context, that would describe infrastructure like the Port of Montreal, the Darlington Nuclear Generating Station, the Irving Oil Refinery in Saint John, NB and the St Lawrence Seaway.

With the CAL established, it then becomes a question of priority and allocation in terms of active air and missile defence (layered and diverse effectors to target incoming threats) and passive air and missile defence (camouflage and concealment, hardening, redundancy, etc) with the intent to strike the right balance between infinite risk at one extreme and infinite cost at the other. Not everything in a nation as large and diverse as Canada can be actively defended which means it is about choices. Making those choices in terms of identifying the most critical and at-risk assets allows for the creation of the Defended Asset List (DAL), which is a subset of the CAL, and facilitates a determination as to how best to defend them.

Canada’s current IAMD capabilities consist of limited ground-based sensors and armed fighter aircraft augmented by US / NORAD sensors. Whether it be UAS, low observable cruise missiles, hypersonic missiles or Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS), not even advanced sensors that provide full domain awareness from seabed to space will permit Canada to deny or defeat the scale and complexity of an attack like those being seen today in both Ukraine and the Middle East with Canada’s current capabilities. Without being able to deny or defeat, there is no deterrence. Achieving that deterrence will require a layered and multi-domain approach that includes air, land and sea-borne weapons based in Canada. Equally as important, the ability to leverage advanced sensors and platforms being delivered, such as OTHR, AEW, F-35 and Future CAOC, will require the design and fielding of a robust digital architecture that supports data movement and data fusion integrated with a command and control network that ensures that not only are the threats seen and acted upon in increasingly reduced timelines but that the weapon used is the one best suited for the threat. As evidenced in the Middle East today, the use of a $3M missile against a $60k drone puts the defender on the wrong side of the cost / benefit curve and gives the attacker the advantage in the long run. That demands that the full spectrum of systems systems be introduced to the Canadian inventory and those systems would best enhance Canada’s defensive capabilities if they are considered within both the domestic and deployed context. The IAMD required to protect the Canadian led battle group in Latvia needs to be capable of doing the same things while integrating within the NATO IAMD System (IAMDS). The problem being solved is the same, the solutions applied should also be similar.

The complexity and 360-degree nature of the threat necessitate a continued and deep relationship with the United States on IAMD. If there was no NORAD, an equivalent to it would need to be created to ensure Canada and the continent remain secure and defended. Whatever Canada leverages to improve IAMD in Canada, and its contribution to continental security, is equally as applicable to its efforts within NATO and the Indo-Pacific region. The air and missile threat in all theatres is varied and complex and solving it will require an integrated solution across multiple domains and nations. Canada’s investment in IAMD will make Canada safer while better contributing to collective security and is essential to being able to deter, detect, deny and defeat any potential adversary.